School quality and housing prices by 吳家偉 & Ng, Ka-wai
Title School quality and housing prices
Other
Contributor(s) University of Hong Kong
Author(s) Ng, Ka-wai; 吳家偉
Citation
Issued Date 2010
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/130965
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
THE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG 
 
SCHOOL QUALITY AND HOUSING PRICES: 
EVIDENCE FROM HONG KONG 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO   
FACULTY OF ARCHITECTURE   
IN CANDIDACY FOR   
THE DEGREE OF   
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN SURVEYING 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE AND CONSTRUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
NG KA WAI 
 
HONG KONG 
APRIL 2010 
 
i 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that this dissertation represents my own work, except where due 
acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, 
dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any other institution for a 
degree, diploma or other qualification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed :  
   
Name :  
   
Date :  
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Residential property agencies in Hong Kong often use “famous school net” as a 
marketing gimmick. Kowloon Tong, for instance, is widely perceived to have many 
good schools. Is this one of the reasons for its high housing prices?  If so, what is the 
housing price premium for living in a famous school net? This research aims to 
answer these questions by conducting two control experiments. Both experiments 
focus on primary school nets because home location primarily determines its primary, 
not secondary, school net under the local education system. The primary school nets 
chosen belong to the same secondary school net. 
 
The first experiment controls for location by comparing properties near the boundary 
of two nets, where one net is known to be much better than the other in terms of 
primary school quality. We find that properties in the better net had a 25% premium 
over those in the other net, although other development-specific factors might also 
account for that premium. 
 
To control for these other factors, the second experiment makes use of the fact that the 
two nets were merged together in 2005. This should bring a relative increase in 
housing prices to the (originally) poorer net. Based on 1,042 transactions, we confirm 
that the relative increase was 4% (p-value<5%). Moreover, the relative increase was 
significantly larger for housing units above 40 m2, a finding that supports a stronger 
school net effect for larger households. 
 
This research confirms the premium for better school in Hong Kong and the findings 
will be useful for valuation, marketing of flats and forming education policies. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The Hong Kong Government spent more than HKD$25 billions on education every 
year from 2004 to 2009 according to the statistics of the Census and Statistics 
Department (2009). It accounted for more than 10% of the government operating 
expenditure, which was almost as much as the expenditure on health. Thanks to the 
financial commitment and the 9-year free compulsory education policy introduced in 
1978, children in Hong Kong enjoy primary school education and 3 years of 
secondary education free of charge. 
 
Despite the free and stable basic education provided by the government, education is 
always a hot topic in Hong Kong. The result of central allocation of school places 
floods the media every year. Any change in education policy often leads to massive 
debate, and sometimes, resentment. 
 
In particular, the policy of school net system is one of the major concerns of parents 
as this system governs the allocation of school places. The system applies to all 
subsidized and government schools in Hong Kong and this represents the majority. 
About 90% of the primary schools and more than 80% of the secondary schools in 
Hong Kong are either subsidized or government schools. Under the school net system, 
students are restricted from applying schools outside their designated school net in the 
Central Allocation Stage. Although certain choices are free from the restriction in the 
Discretionary Places Admission Stage, it will be shown in Chapter 3 that school net 
system matters a lot while parents are struggling for a “better school”. 
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There are currently 18 secondary school nets in Hong Kong and they are subdivided 
into 36 primary school nets. The primary school students are assigned with a 
secondary school net basing on the primary school they go to and children are 
assigned with a primary school net basing on their residential address. In short, if a 
parent has any preferred primary or secondary school in mind, the parent has to 
choose the home location very carefully. By choosing a home location in the school 
net where the preferred primary or secondary school is located, it boosts the chance of 
getting into that school. The detail explanation and calculation will be in Chapter 3. 
 
The distribution of the perceived better schools is not even in Hong Kong. If we refer 
to any publication that provides “tips” for parents, there are a few school nets that are 
said to be better. The idea is further reinforced by the fact that “better school net” is 
often used as a mean to promote certain properties. One can observe the properties in 
the perceived better school nets include “good school net” in the property description 
(Centaline Property Agency 2010a). Examples are Kowloon Tong, Central and 
Western District and Ho Man Tin. This does not appear to be random as properties in 
other school nets do not contain any school net information. The uneven distribution 
of better schools under the school net system, together with parents’ desire to get their 
children to better schools, implies that a careful choice of residential address matters. 
 
 Objectives 
This dissertation aims at exploring the premium for better school on property price. In 
particular, it further attempts to identify the asymmetric effect on different properties. 
 
The first objective of this dissertation is to work out the first empirical test in Hong 
Kong to identify the premium for living in a better school net by conducting two 
3 
 
control experiments. 
 
The second objective is to reveal, if any, the asymmetric premium for better school on 
different households. 
 
With the 2 objectives, 2 hypotheses are formulated. The rationale and their testable 
implications will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is: 
If the school net is better, then the residential property price in the school net will be 
higher. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is: 
If there is a premium for better school on property price, then it is larger for 
households with education needs. 
 
Research Design 
Past research such as Jud and Watt (1981) had proven the positive linkage between 
better school and residential property price. The concept of boundary-fixed approach 
was adopted to test the hypotheses (Black 1999, Bogart 2000 and Kane et al. 2006) so 
that the neighbourhood characteristics could be controlled. Unfortunately, similar 
research has not yet been carried out in Hong Kong where education floods the media 
from time to time and better school nets are always used as a promotion tool for 
residential flats. This attracts the author to research on this topic in Hong Kong. The 
lack of past research is probably due to the difficulty in locating suitable research 
location. The boundary-fixed approach used by Black (1999) can hardly be tested 
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given the current school net distribution. Considering all the school net boundaries in 
Hong Kong now, there are only few locations where residential buildings are situated 
on both sides of the boundary and most of them are not having sufficient transactions 
to carry out an empirical test. After examining every single school net boundary in 
Hong Kong from 2000 to 2009, only 1 suitable location is found. 
 
The premium identified by the boundary-fixed approach could take into account other 
development-specific factors. To reinforce such experiment, the author uses an extra 
experiment, the experiment of the merger of school nets, to complement the boundary 
experiment and conduct a more promising test for Hypothesis 1. There were once 58 
primary school nets in Hong Kong in 2000. The number was gradually reduced to 36 
in 2008 as the Education Bureau merged primary school nets over the years. It is 
found that one of the mergers had great effect on the residents’ probability to get into 
better schools in 2 school nets. By working out the change in both school nets 
qualitatively and quantitatively, the effect is testable and the restriction of the location 
(boundary-fixed) is not necessary. The effect of the merger can therefore be tested on 
top of the boundary-fixed experiment so that a more promising result could be 
achieved. 
 
It is believed that such school net effect would have a greater value to families with 
children because the families are the ones who have education needs. The author then 
tries to test the asymmetric effect of this linkage on properties with different sizes. 
 
Significance of the research 
Probably due to the difficulties in quantifying better schools and identifying testable 
implications, there was no previous research testing the premium in Hong Kong. 
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Therefore, this dissertation would be a significant first step to study the topic 
empirically in Hong Kong. Also, the dissertation attempts to test this link on 
properties with different sizes so that the topic could be linked to the housing choice 
of families. Both of these would assist further research, such as investment decisions, 
education policy and marketing of flats. 
 
Structure 
The dissertation contains 6 chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction of the 
dissertation. It includes the topic, the motivation, and the objectives and significances. 
 
Chapter 2 is literature review. Past research on the influence of better school over 
housing are examined in terms of result and methodology. From the review, research 
gap could be identified. Relevant literatures about proxy for quantifying better schools 
and Hedonic Model will be included to support the methodology of the research. 
 
Chapter 3 is overview of primary and secondary schooling in Hong Kong. Since the 
link between residential property price and better school is built upon the school place 
allocation system and school nets, background information about the system and the 
implications of school nets will be discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 is hypotheses and methodology. 2 hypotheses of the dissertation and their 
testable implications are introduced in this chapter. Besides, details of the 3 tests and 
the robustness check, such as their rationale, predicted result, and their advantages and 
disadvantages over one another, will be discussed. 
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Chapter 5 is empirical result. Results of the tests will be interpreted so that they can be 
cross-checked with the predictions of the hypotheses. 
 
Chapter 6 is conclusion. The summary of findings and the limitations of the research 
are included. Recommendations for future studies are also provided. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Past researches on the premium for better schooling will be reviewed in this chapter. 
The theory, evidence and methodology of the researches will be presented. In 
particular, the way to quantify “better school” will be highlighted due to its high 
relevance to this dissertation. As quantifying better school is an important element, the 
public’s attitude of a potential proxy, English Medium of Instruction (EMI) school, 
will also be reviewed. Then, it is followed by the general theoretical background of 
the Hedonic Pricing Model which will be used in this dissertation. It will include the 
review of the variables used by various researches on better schooling and the 
common variables employed by Hong Kong researches to control different 
characteristics. At the end of this chapter, the research gap will be identified and the 
lessons from past literatures will be presented. 
 
Schooling and housing price 
The theory and evidence 
The linkage between neighbourhood schooling and housing price was established in 
numerous research with the use of hedonic model. They were based on the theoretical 
background of Tiebout (1956) which argued that people would move to different 
locations in order to acquire the geographically defined goods and services. This idea 
was further reinforced by Rosen (1974) who regarded housing as a series of 
characteristics and could be separately analyzed. Jud and Watts (1981), basing on the 
results in Kain and Quigley (1970) and Li and Brown (1980), is the frequently quoted 
research that established the positive correlation between better schools and housing 
value. Clark and Herrin (2000) even argued that the attributes of schools were more 
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highly valued by residents than crime and environmental quality measures. 
 
Methodology 
In Black (1999), it was pointed out that previous studies might have insufficient 
control on neighbourhood characteristics. Better schools tend to be located in better 
neighbourhoods, such as proximity to employment and recreational amenities (Kane, 
et al. 2006). Also, Colwell and Guntermann (1999) proved a relationship between 
house value and the proximity to a school. In previous studies, variables like crime 
rate, accessibility index, recreation index (Haurin 1996), distance from downtown and 
neighbour residents (Hayes and Taylor 1996) were adopted to control neighbourhood 
factors. 
 
In order to minimize the problem, Black (1999) controlled neighbourhood 
characteristics by comparing housing on the opposite sides of the attendance district 
boundary. Attendance district boundaries are defined as “geographic lines that 
determine which school a child attends within a school district”. The selected 
attendance districts were all in Massachusetts so that variation in school spending and 
property tax were also controlled. This strategy avoided the potential overestimation 
of the value of better school on housing in previous studies. Same methodology was 
used (Bogart 2000 and Kane et al. 2006). 
 
Seo and Simons (2008), after reviewing the critiques from Clark and Herrin (2000), 
Clapp et al. (2005) and Brasington and Haurin (2006), suggested that such 
boundary-fixed effect is appropriate when study area is small and relatively 
homogeneous but inappropriate for studies that examine a large geographical 
boundary. 
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Bogart and Cromwell (2000), other than adopting the district-fixed effect in a 
relatively small area, purposely picked a school district widely perceived to be of high 
quality and this made the research more applicable outside the distressed districts.  
Controls for racial composition and transportation service were also included. 
 
Findings along the boundaries 
Black (1999) and Kane et al. (2006) identified a discontinuous change of housing 
characteristics and population characteristics respectively in their research. Kane et al. 
(2006) suggested that housing quality differences were likely to arise when the 
boundaries for the areas are stable as high income families move in to areas with good 
schools. 
 
Quantifying better schools 
Despite the fact that a positive correlation was identified in the research, different 
proxies were adopted in the extensive literatures to quantify the quality of schooling. 
Test score was one of the most common measures. Jud and Watts (1981) adopted the 
3rd grade achievement test scores. Black (1999) also argued that better test 
performance of students would lead to higher property prices while Kane et al. (2006) 
adopted mean test scores of elemental, middle and high schools as a benchmark. 
Rosen and Fullerton (1977) supplemented expenditure per pupil by adding 
achievement test score as another variable and argued that achievement test score is 
able to improve the result. Some others included 8th grade Mathematics score (Clapp 
et al. 2008) and the ability to reach the government specified grade (Gibbons and 
Machin 2003). 
 
Figlio and Lucas (2004) used comprehensive measures of school quality such as 
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school rating introduced by the No Child Left Behind Act in the US. Oates (1969) 
suggested higher school spending leads to higher housing value. Hayes and Taylor 
(1996) argued the higher housing value was the result of the higher marginal effect of 
school on students, which followed the measurement of school quality in Hanushek 
(1986). In Hayes and Taylor (1996), premium for school quality was suggested to be 
the most important determinant of housing value and the analysis revealed that not all 
the school characteristics were indicators of school quality. The result also implied 
that the marginal effect of the schools mattered while school expenditures and the 
characteristics of the student body might not be relevant. Brasington (1999) used 
similar method as Hayes and Taylor (1996) but researched in a larger scale. More 
variables such as attendance rate and student-to-teacher ratio were included. It was 
concluded that proficiency test scores could be a better indicator than value-added. 
Gibbons and Machin (2002) worked out the first empirical evidence in the United 
Kingdom by using the percentage of primary school children reaching the 
government-specified target grade as a benchmark for better neighbourhood. 
Benchmark of gaining five A-C in GCSEs in secondary schools was also used in 
research (Rosenthal 2003). Brasington and Haurin (2006) compared value-added 
approach with other proxies and concluded that little evidence supported the use of it. 
Seo and Simons (2008) questioned the extent of influences of various proxies and 
tested their effect after categorizing the proxies in previous studies into input factors 
such as expenditure per student, output factors such as test scores, and value-added 
factors such as increase in output levels over the previous period. It is concluded that 
output variables performed better. A table summarizing the common proxies used in 
past research is shown in the following page. Their results are also recorded. 
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Table 1: Summary of results and proxies for better school 
Author Result Proxy for better school 
Jud and Watt (1981) 5.2% increase in house price per unit of test score 3rd grade reading test score 
Black (1999) 2.5% increase in house price per 5% increase in test score 4th grade Masachusetts Educational 
Assessment Programme 
Hayes and Taylor 
(1996) 
0.26% increase in house price per 1% increase in test score; 
0.49% increase in house price per 1% increase in expenditure per pupil 
6th grade Mathematics achievement, 
expenditure per pupil, peer group in 
schools 
Clark and Herrin 
(2000) 
5.2% increase in house price per 1.6 student reduction in a class; 
2.7% increase in house price per 3.1% increase in student taking SAT 
School dropout rate, percentage of senior 
class that took the Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT), teacher-student ratio 
Gibbons and Machin 
(2003) 
0.67% increase in house price per 1 percentage point increase in the rate of reaching the 
government specified target grade 
Government specified target grade 
Brasington and 
Haurin (2006) 
7.1% increase in house price per standard deviation increase in test scores District’s average proficiency test scores 
and expenditure 
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Kane, Reigg and 
Staiger (2006) 
10% point increase in house value per standard deviation increase in school’s mean test 
score 
Schools’ mean test score 
Clapp et al. (2008) 1.3-1.4% increase in house price per standard deviation increase in maths score 8th grade Mathematics test score 
Seo and Simons 
(2008) 
US$3.5 increase in house price per standard deviation increase of teachers’ experience; 
US$5973 increase in house price per 1 percent passage rate in 4th grade Mathematics; 
5.5% to 11% more in house price for the well rated districts, comparing to the poorly 
rated ones 
Teachers’ experience, 4th grade 
Mathematics score, school district report 
card (A rating given under the No 
Children Left Behind Act in the US) 
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As Hanushek (1986) had argued, the measurements of school quality are complicated 
and not sufficiently quantified. Kane et al. (2006) found that value-added measure 
was indistinguishable, which was consistent to the result in Rothstein (2006). It was 
suggested to be reflecting the difficulty the parents faced in differentiating the school 
quality. West et al. (1998) suggested that researchers cannot rely on institutional 
assumptions to be valid across different areas of the country and different models 
have to be employed to study parental behaviours. 
 
Perceived value on English Medium of Instruction (EMI) 
education 
Evidence on the actual benefits brought by EMI to students was inconclusive (Pierson 
1987, Lin 1996a and Lin 1996b). However, the status and its importance in career 
were addressed (Luke 1984, Bourdieu 1991 and Lin 1996b). Perhaps the struggle for 
English as the medium of instruction in Hong Kong is best summarized as followed. 
  
“There is no point in determining whether children in Hong Kong 
would learn more effectively through English or Chinese. We already 
know that they would learn more effectively through Chinese . . . Our 
problems arise because their learning of English will be more 
effectively achieved by using it as a medium of instruction. So long as 
this is a dominant aim of the education system then the questions that 
remain relate to how it can be used with least disturbance of learning 
within the curriculum and for how many it can be used without serious 
and irrevocable disruption of learning” 
Po (2003) p680 (Quoted from Brimer et al. 1985) 
 
14 
 
Perceived value 
Successful EMI education was seen as a prerequisite for socio-economic advancement 
(Evans 2000). Po (2003) showed that students associated career with English. In So 
(1992), with reference to the statistics (So 1984 and So 1986), it was concluded that 
English standard was the primary concern of parents but there was no evidence 
showing that they preferred EMI schools or rejected Chinese Medium of Instruction 
(CMI) schools. Despite the fact that there was no conclusive evidence in past 
literatures, some literatures did record the reaction of parents and schools regarding to 
the change of medium of instruction from EMI to CMI of schools. These might show 
the preference of some parents. 
 
“Scenes of tearful teenagers and angry, disheartened parents of ‘elite’ 
schools which had failed to retain English teaching were captured on 
newspapers and TV, often against the backdrop of protest banners on 
the school premises” 
(Po 2003 p674) 
 
“…They have to switch back to English medium since they do not want 
to be labelled as second class, as Chinese-medium schools have 
traditionally been stigmatised given the socioeconomic domination of 
English in society” 
(Lin 1996b p77) 
 
“The parents of the children of a school marched to protest their 
school’s decision to change their medium of instruction to Chinese” 
Lin (1996b) p77 
15 
 
Hedonic Pricing Model 
The model is one of the most common models used to study the relationship between 
the dependent variable and independent variables in the property market. Its long 
history was discussed in various research (Malpezzi 2002 and Sirmans et al. 2005). 
 
The history of Hedonic Modelling can be traced back to Court (1939) where a 
hedonic price index for automobiles was adopted. Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974) 
were the 2 classic papers for studies on characteristics, with the focus on demand side 
of the market. In particular, Rosen (1974) did not place the focus on utility but the 
bid-offer process of the characteristics as well as the marginal change, and concluded 
that market prices were comparable while differentiated goods were treated as tied 
packages of characteristics. Thereafter, researchers have been adopting these as the 
theoretical background to study properties with Hedonic Modelling (Linneman 1980, 
Hayes and Taylor 1996 and Downes and Zabel 2002). 
 
There were many researches on property in Hong Kong which adopted this model and 
they covered a wide range of characteristics. For example, amenities in the 
neighbourhood (Liisa and Antti 2000), floor level, age and accessibility of buildings 
(Mok et al. 1995) and even the concept of lucky floors in the Chinese tradition (Chau 
2001). Theoretically, due to the unique characteristics of a flat or a building, there 
could be an unlimited number of independent variables that affect the determination 
of property prices. Researchers are then left with a question on the choice of 
independent variables. Butler (1982) provided us with a new perspective with his 
research on bias. It was believed that a lot of characteristics could be included in the 
model, but there could be more that had been excluded and researchers should be 
sensitive to the specification bias. 
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Butler (1982) categorized the independent variables into structural and non-structural. 
Powe et al. (1995): further broke down the non-structure independent variables into 5 
types. The 5 types of independent variables are summarized as: 
 
1. Structural characteristics: e.g. plot size and number of rooms 
2. Environmental and neighbourhood characteristics: e.g. landscape and air quality 
3. Locational or accessibility characteristics: e.g. access to ships and urban centres 
4. Local socio-economic and public sector characteristics: e.g. unemployment rate 
and wage differentials 
5. Property rights or legal constraints regulating the use of the property 
 
Choice of independent variables 
A discrepancy in the choice of variables is observed between Western studies and 
Hong Kong studies. Structural characteristics like number of bedrooms, number of 
bathroom, plumbing fixtures, type of air conditioning and average room size were 
taken into account in various Western studies on schooling (Jud and Watt 1981, 
Brasington 1998, Bogart and Cromwell 2000, Goodman and Thibodeau 2003 and 
Leech and Campos 2003). Environmental and neighbourhood characteristics like 
ethnic groups (Goodman 1977) and community size (Brasington 2000) were also 
included.  
 
These were in addition to the typical variables adopted by Hong Kong research which 
included age, floor level, sea view and floor area (Mok et al. 1995, Chau 2001, Tse 
2002 and Hastings et al. 2005). The major reason could be the compact development 
in Hong Kong (Li 2005), which resulted in little variation in variables like plumbing 
17 
 
fixtures and air quality in most of the cases. Also, in Hong Kong, locational or 
accessibility characteristics are not commonly included unless they are under the 
scope of study (So et al. 1997). 
 
In Hong Kong, socio-economic, public sector characteristics and property rights 
constraints are not included in researches as they do not vary within Hong Kong. 
 
Research gap and the applications of past methodologies 
The positive correlation between better school and property price was well established 
in the US by the use of Hedonic Pricing Model. The boundary-fixed approach used by 
Black (1999) and other subsequent researchers is very suitable for the test in Hong 
Kong as far as the idea from Seo and Simons (2008) is valid as the school nets in 
Hong Kong are small and relatively homogeneous. However, such research has not 
yet been carried out in Hong Kong. This motivated the author to research on this topic 
with the use of the boundary-fixed approach. 
 
Hedonic Pricing Model will be used to test the hypotheses and the variables included 
will follow the past research norm. Bogart and Cromwell (1999)’s idea of using better 
school districts will also be employed as Hong Kong is not considered as a distress 
area. The details of the tests will be explained in Chapter 4 and the background of 
school nets in Hong Kong will be included in Chapter 3. 
 
It can be seen that there is no general agreement on the proxy to be used to quantify 
the quality of schools. Output, such as test result, and input, such as expenditure per 
student, were often adopted and some others suggested comprehensive benchmark 
which includes both of them. Given that no official information about school output 
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and input is provided in Hong Kong, the suggestion from West et al. (1998) and Kane 
et al. (2006) provides a guide for this dissertation and new proxy would be used 
basing on the information parents receive. Details will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
The literatures about EMI are not conclusive but it does reveal some support from 
parents. This idea will be justified by the requirements imposed by the government on 
EMI schools in Chapter 4 and it will be used as one of the proxies to quantify better 
schools. 
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CHAPTER 3: OVERVIEW OF SCHOOLING IN  
HONG KONG 
Background of the school net system will be introduced. Basing on the current system 
and past statistics, it will be demonstrated that the majority of primary and secondary 
students undergo the Central Allocation stage of school places in Hong Kong. It 
means that home location influences the access of better schools for the majority. This 
link allows the research on the premium for better education to be conducted in the 
housing market. At the end of the chapter, parents’ perception of “better” schooling 
will be discussed. 
 
School net system 
The Education Bureau (2008) had stated that primary school admission is primarily 
net-based as it is the goal to avoid children to travel for unreasonably long distances 
to attend schools. As a result, school nets were formed to govern the restricted school 
choice of parents after taking into consideration the geographical areas and the 
distribution of schools. 
 
School net and residential property 
There are currently 30 primary school nets under POAS and 18 secondary school nets 
under SSPA. The division of the 18 secondary school nets under SSPA is literally 
based on the POAS Primary school nets. In other words, 1 SSPA secondary school net 
may include more than 1 primary school net. The idea is shown in the following 
figure. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the hierarchy of school nets (with secondary school net 
41 as an example) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
The place where the children reside will determine the primary school net a student 
belongs to under POAS. The physical location of the primary school the student 
attends determines the secondary school net a student belongs to under SSPA. In short, 
the residential address of a child would determine the primary school net he/she 
belongs to and therefore influence the school choices of primary schools. This, in turn, 
also affects the school choice of secondary school indirectly. 
 
Boundaries 
The distribution of the current primary and secondary school nets is shown in 
Appendix 3. It can be observed that the boundaries are always drawn beside 
non-residential developments. This setting places a difficulty on adopting the 
methodology proposed by Black (1999) which used the boundary-fixed approach to 
control neighbourhood factors as mentioned in Chapter 2. 
 
Merger of school nets 
It is also important to note that the number of primary school net was reduced from 
Net 41 
School Net: Primary 
School level  Net 34  Net 41 Net 35 
School Net: Secondary 
School level 
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time to time. The number was 58 in 2000 but it is reduced to 36 in 2009 after various 
mergers. This allows the tests on the hypotheses and the details will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Overview of the types of primary and secondary schooling in 
Hong Kong 
There are five types of schools as categorized by Education and Manpower Bureau 
(2002) and they include government schools, subsidized schools, Direct Subsidy 
Scheme schools, private schools as well as English Schools Foundation and 
international schools. 
 
Government schools and subsidized schools 
Government schools are schools operated by the HKSAR Government while 
subsidized schools are schools that receive government aid but managed by 
non-government organizations, such as charity organizations. Standard school fee is 0 
due to the government policy of 9-year free and compulsory education. In order to 
admit to these types of school, students have to undergo The Primary One Admission 
System and Secondary School Places Allocation System for their admission. 
 
Direct Subsidy Scheme schools 
In 1991, the Direct Subsidy Scheme was set up according to the recommendations in 
the Education Commission Report No.3 (Education Bureau 1988). Under the scheme, 
participating schools are free to choose their curriculum, fees and entrance 
requirements. They can still receive subsidies from the government and the amount is 
based on their operating history and the number of eligible student enrolled. In other 
words, the tuition fee could be expensive and they have independency over the 
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policies of student admission. 
 
Private schools, English Schools Foundation (ESF) and international schools 
Private schools are operated by private organization with independence in areas like 
admission policy and school fees. The school fee of this type of school could be more 
than HK$20000 per annum. International schools are schools offering full non-local 
curricula to students. These schools provide an alternative of the mainstream 
curriculum but tuition fee generally could be more than HK$70000 per annum. ESF is 
an organization which operates more than 21 international schools in Hong Kong. The 
difference between ESF schools and international schools is that ESF is formed under 
The English Schools Foundation Ordinance (CAP 1117). Despite receiving subsidy 
from the Hong Kong Government, the ESF basically charge HK$58100 for primary 
school fee and HK$89250 for secondary school fee per annum. It also has 
independent admission policies. 
 
Students under the government school admission system 
The number of school under each of the above mentioned school types are recorded in 
2002 by the government. 
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Figure 2: Number and percentage of primary schools under different categories 
 
Education Bureau (2002) 
 
Figure 3: Number and percentage of secondary schools under different categories 
 
Education and Manpower Bureau (2002) 
 
The figures show that about 90% of the primary schools and more than 80% of the 
secondary schools are either government or subsidized schools. Although the figure 
may have fallen due to the expansion of Direct Subsidy Scheme schools, the majority 
is still government and subsidized schools. In other words, the majority of the 
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students, who wish to study in Hong Kong, are required to undergo the school 
allocation process provided by the Hong Kong Government so as to secure a place in 
government or subsidized schools. 
 
The Primary One Admission System (POAS) 
It is the current primary school place allocation system in Hong Kong for government 
and subsidized schools. The system aims at eliminating the pressure imposed on 
children by the competition to enter popular primary schools. The details are listed at 
the website of Education Bureau (2010). 4 prerequisites have to be met by applicants: 
1. reach the age of 5 years 8 months when the child is enrolled in primary 1 in 
September each year 
2. be a Hong Kong resident 
3. not be attending any primary schools 
4. have never been allocated a primary 1 place 
 
The system is divided into 2 stages and they are namely Discretionary Places 
Admission stage and Central Allocation stage. Under the system, the territory is 
divided into 30 school nets. Parents can only apply for the primary schools that are 
under the primary school net they reside in the Central Allocation Stage. 
 
Discretionary Places Admission (DPA) 
If the parents have a preferred school in mind, they could choose to participate in this 
admission stage. In this stage, parents can apply for 1 government or aided school 
which could be within or outside the primary school net they reside. Their application 
will then be processed under 2 different categories. 
The applications will be under the first category if the applicants are having sibling or 
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parent working in the school. This category will take up about 30% of the school’s 
primary 1 place. If the applications exceed 30% of the places, the shortfall will be 
made up by the places reserved for the central allocation. On the other hand, if the 
number is less than 30% of the places, the remaining places will be allocated to the 
second category – the Points System. 
 
Not less than 20% of the primary 1 school places will be taken up by the Points 
System and applications will be assessed solely on the predetermined criteria which 
are listed in the following table. 
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Table 2: List of criteria to score points under the Points System 
Content  Point 
Parent(s) teaching or working full-time in the kindergarten or secondary 
section if it is of the same address as the primary school 
20 
Sibling(s) studying in the secondary section if it is of the same address 
as the primary school 
20 
Parent(s) being a school manager of the primary school 20 
Parent(s) or sibling(s) being a graduate of the primary school 10 
First-born child (the eldest child in the family irrespective of sex) 5 
Same religious affiliation as the sponsoring body which operates the 
primary school 
5 
Parent(s) being a member of the same organization which sponsors the 
operation of the primary school 
5 
Applicant of the right age (5 years 8 months to 7 years old) 10 
 
The 30% of the school places is not believed to be significant to the parents due to the 
relatively little influence on school allocation. First of all, if none of the sibling of the 
parent of the child is working in the preferred school, the child will not be qualified 
under the first category. This is rather physical and can hardly be controlled by parents. 
Secondly, criteria under the Points System, such as sibling studying in the preferred 
school or parents working in the secondary sector of the school, are also hard to be 
controlled. Thirdly, even though some parents may still bet on the Points System, the 
school places under the system is relatively few and there is a little chance to get into 
the school through this system. Take the better primary schools in school net 341 as 
                                                      
1  Will be defined in Chapter 4 and the figures used here are in 2005. 
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an example, there are only 54 to 156 primary 1 school place in each better school. As 
a result, there are only about 11 to 31 school places in each better school under the 
Points System admission. These places are open for every single eligible applicant for 
competition under the point system. Consider the several ten thousands of eligible 
children and probably thousands of children possess similar points, there is a very low 
chance of winning this bet. 
 
Central Allocation Stage (CAS) 
Children who are not offered with a place under DPA or those who did not apply for 
DPA will participate in CAS. Parents have the discretion to choose up to three choices 
of schools regardless of which school net they reside (unrestricted school choices) 
while the remaining choices (restricted school choices) are bounded by school nets. 
This restricted school choices is the key linkage between better schooling and home 
location as home location determines the school net a child belongs to. Primary 
schools will reserve about 50% of their primary 1 places for the allocation under CAS. 
In this 50% school places, 10% will be assigned to the applicants under unrestricted 
school choices. The remaining 90% are for the applications which are restricted 
school choices. Application under unrestricted school choices will be process first and 
then followed by the process of restricted school choices. 
 
In CAS, there are 2 criteria for the allocation of school places. They are parental 
choices of schools and random number. 
 
Parental choices of schools 
Parents have to rank the selected primary schools in their order of preference on the 
application. School places allocating will follow the preference. However, if the 
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school is oversubscribed, random number will be used. 
 
Random number 
A computer programme which adopts “random number” is employed by the 
government while allocating school places of the oversubscribed schools. This 
random number, which is unique to each applicant, will decide the order of priority in 
allocating school places. 
 
Similar to the school places allocation under DPA, the unrestricted school choices are 
believed to be insignificant to the parents. There are only 5% of the primary school 
places of a school allocated in such way and it is only talking about 5 to 16 school 
places in a school and it is open for competition in the territory (regardless of school 
net which is based on home location). 
 
Therefore, it is the restricted school choice which matters. Although only 50% of the 
school place is allocated in this way, the competition is restricted to the students in a 
school net and there are only about few thousands eligible applicants in a school net. 
Also, unlike DPA, parents are able to choose more than 1 school to apply. By having a 
home location in a better school net which has lots of better schools, the chance of 
their child to get into a better school will then be improved significantly. Take the 
previous example of school net 34. Given the 50% of better school2 place accounts 
for about 300 school places and the eligible applicants accounts for about 900 people, 
the chance of getting into a better school is about 30% and this is a very high rate 
comparing to the less than 1% chance in DPA and unrestricted school place in CAS. 
Now we turn to secondary school place allocation. 
                                                      
2  Will be defined in Chapter 4 and the figures used here are in 2005. 
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Secondary School Places Allocation System (SSPA) 
If parents wish their children to be allocated a government or subsidized secondary 1 
school place, they will undergo the SSPA upon the completion of primary school 
education. Details are also presented at the website of Education Bureau (2010). The 
prerequisites for application are: 
1. being a Hong Kong resident 
2. studying in a Primary school participating in the SSPA System 
3. never been allocated an secondary 1 place before 
 
Like the POAS, the system is divided into Discretionary Places Admission (DPA) and 
Central Allocation Stage (CAS). 
 
Discretionary Places Admission (DPA) 
Parents could choose up to 2 participating secondary schools listed in the Handbook 
for Application for Secondary 1 Discretionary Places. These choices are free from the 
restriction of secondary school nets. Secondary schools are allowed to reserve not 
more than 30% of their secondary 1 places for DPA and may admit students according 
to their educational philosophy and other criteria which are made public. 
 
Central Allocation Stage (CAS) 
If students are not assigned with a school under the DPA or they do not choose to 
undergo DPA, they will then enter the CAS. After the deduction of the places for 
repeater (less than 5% of the school places) and discretionary places, the remaining 
places are allocated under CAS. Similar to POAS, there are unrestricted school 
choices and restricted school choices, with the later choices bounded by school nets. 
There will be 10% of the school places under CAS assigned for unrestricted school 
30 
 
choices while 90% will be assigned for restricted school choices. 
 
CAS allocates places according to 3 criteria and they are namely allocation band, 
parental choice of schools and random number. The details of the later two criteria are 
same as those in the CAS in POAS except that parents can choose up to 30 schools 
under the category of restricted school choices in SSPA. To avoid duplication, only 
allocation band will be discussed in this part. 
 
Allocation band 
Bandings will be granted to applicants with reference to the students’ internal 
assessment results at the end of primary 5, mid-year and the end of primary 6 after 
scaling. There are 2 types of banding which deal with unrestricted and restricted 
school choices. 
 
As regard to the allocation of school places for unrestricted school places, the students 
in the territory will be equally divided into 3 Territory Bands with each band accounts 
for one third of the total number of primary students. 
 
As regard to the allocation of school places in for restricted school choices, the 
students within the same school net will be divided into 3 Net Bands with each 
consisting of one third of the total number of primary students in the school net. The 
banding will be used as one of the proxies for better school. Details will be discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
 
Given the same rationale as in POAS, it is believed that restricted school choices 
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matter. However, as the effect of secondary school net is controlled by the sampling3 
in this dissertation, it will not be discussed in details here. 
 
“Better” schools 
There is currently no official information like banding and average open examination 
scores provided to the parents due to the avoidance of labelling effect as stated in the 
minutes of Legislative Council Panel on Education dated 19th April, 1999. 
 
As a result, many parents resort to informal information. For instance, Chiu (2004 and 
2005) are the leading publication for school choice written by teachers and reporters. 
Ming Pao Publication Limited secured the information through series of interviews. 3 
categories of schools are included as “better” in the 2 publications: 
 
1. schools having a high rate of oversubscription under Discretionary Places 
Admission 
2. schools having a high percentage of student allocated with allocation band 1, the 
best allocation band under Secondary School Places Allocation System 
3. schools having a high percentage of student admitting to an English Medium 
Instruction secondary school 
 
It is not hard to understand why the first 2 categories are regarded as better schools. 
Oversubscription reflects the preference of parents and banding reflects the internal 
assessment result of the students. 
 
 
                                                      
3  Will be explained in Chapter 4 
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Regarding to the third category, literatures included in Chapter 2 had provided a brief 
background of parents’ preference but it not conclusive. A more in-depth discussion 
on EMI schools is therefore needed. 
 
There are actually a few standards that the EMI schools have to meet so as to maintain 
their EMI status. This has provided a kind of quality control (Education Bureau 1997). 
It is required that the not less than 85% of the students should be able of learn 
effectively in English as assessed by the Medium of Instruction Grouping Assessment. 
Also, the teachers of these schools should be capable enough and Education Bureau 
will send inspectors to gather information from time to time. Last but not least, 
support strategies and programmes such as bridging courses have to be provided to 
students. All these quality control provide a sign of “better” to parents. Admitting to 
these schools will be regarded as something good and the use of this indicator in Chiu 
(2004 and 2005) is reinforced. 
 
Summary 
Students participating CAS under POAS 
To summarize the information, about 45% of the school places of each primary 
government or subsidized school places are allocated under CAS of POAS and are 
restricted by primary school nets. The school places matters a lot as far as the chance 
of getting into a better school is concerned. So parents, who have a preferred primary 
school in mind but without sufficient point under the point system to admit to that 
school and at the same time none of the parent or children’s sibling is working in the 
school, the only thing they can resort to is their chance in CAS by switching their 
home to the school net where the preferred primary school is located. 
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Students participating CAS under SSPA 
About 63% of the school places of each secondary government or subsidized school 
are allocated under the CAS of SSPA each year with the restriction of secondary 
school nets. By locating in a school net where the preferred secondary schools are 
situated, it gives parents higher chance of going to the primary schools in that school 
net as restricted school net matters most. This, in turn, means an increase in the 
chance of getting into a preferred secondary school under CAS in SSPA by the same 
token. 
 
Better School and home location 
As far as parents perceive some schools as “better” and they are unevenly distributed 
in the school nets, there will be some “better” school net and some “worse” ones. 
Therefore, research can be conducted and it will be elaborated in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Hypotheses and their rationale will be explained. 2 experiments are formulated 
accordingly and they are namely boundary-fixed approach and school net merger. 
Their details and applications in the 3 regression tests as well as in the robustness 
check will be described. The variables in each test and their source will also be 
included in this chapter. 
 
Hypotheses and rationale 
There are 2 hypotheses in this dissertation. Hypothesis 1 is based on the previous 
researches mentioned in Chapter 2 that proved the positive relationship between better 
schooling and housing prices, such as Jud and Watt (1981). Also, under the school 
place allocation in Hong Kong described in Chapter 3, the school net system, home 
location has great effect on the access of better schooling and people could be willing 
to pay a premium. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is: 
If the school net is better, then the residential property price in the school net will be 
higher. 
 
“Better” school nets 
Better school net is defined by the dissertation as: 
“A primary school net has a higher probability of admitting to a better school”. 
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Higher probability is defined as a higher ratio of: 
“Number of primary 1 school places of better subsidized or government school 
divided by the number of eligible applicants of The Primary One Admission System 
in the school net”. 
 
To illustrate, the statistics of the school nets studied in this dissertation are presented 
below. Before the merger of school net in 2005 and recall the better school defined by 
Chiu (2004 and 2005) in Chapter 3, the probability is calculated as follows: 
 
Table 3: Statistics of primary school net 34 and 36 
 Net 34 Net36 
(1) “Better” school places 311 0 
(2) Eligible student  852 789 
Before merger = (1)/(2) 36.50% 0.00% 
Conclusion Better Worse 
 
“Better” schools 
The view of West et al. (1998) is adopted and different proxies for better school are 
used under the unique socio-economic context in Hong Kong. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, it is impossible to identify a proxy from the information provided by the 
HKSAR Government due to the avoidance of labelling effect. “Better” schools will be 
defined by the unofficial information parents can gain access. The 3 categories of 
better schools are based on Chiu (2004 and 2005) as referred in Chapter 3. 
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1. schools having high rate of oversubscription under Discretionary Places 
Admission 
2. schools having a high percentage of student allocated with allocation band 1, the 
best allocation band under Secondary School Places Allocation System 
3. schools having a high percentage of student admitting to an English Medium 
Instruction secondary school 
 
The rate of oversubscription does not fall into any of the 3 proxy categories (output, 
input and value-added) for better schools as defined by Seo and Simons (2008), but it 
can be seen as a reflection of parents’ preference. Allocation band is a proxy of the 
output of the schools. The definition relying on EMI admission is backed up by some 
literatures which showed the perception of the parents and students. Besides, the 
requirements by the Education Bureau act as a quality control which secures the 
quality of the education in EMI schools. The percentage of students admitting to an 
EMI secondary school can therefore be seen as a proxy for the output of the primary 
schools. 
 
In this dissertation, only primary schools are studied and there are 2 reasons. Firstly, 
home location primarily determines the primary school net a student belongs to. 
Secondly, there is only 1 primary school net boundary where the use of 
boundary-fixed approach as well as the study of merger can feasibly be conducted 
after examining all the primary and secondary school net boundaries in Hong Kong. 
Besides, the “better” schools have to be government or subsidized schools so that 
home location affects school place allocation under CAS as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
37 
 
From hypothesis 1, 2 testable implications can be developed. Firstly, the residential 
property price in the better school net will be higher. Secondly, when the school net 
becomes better after the merger, the residential property price of the school net will 
increase. 
 
Hypothesis 1 can be tested against the null hypothesis of: 
If the school net is better, then the residential property price in the school net will not 
be higher. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is supported if this null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is based on the belief that the premium for better school is asymmetric 
to different households. Households with education needs (those with children) will 
have a larger premium. It is believed that families with children would secure a larger 
living space. As it is hard to find a flat in the studied area with only 1 bedroom, the 
author then used a threshold of gross floor area as a proxy. The cutoff is based on the 
class classification by the Rating and Valuation Department which will be discussed 
in the next section. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is: 
If there is a premium for better school on property price, then it is larger for 
households with education needs. 
 
Households with education needs 
Households with education needs are defined as those households with children. To 
yield testable implications from the hypothesis, the author makes the following 
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assumption: 
Households with education needs (children) will live in bigger properties. 
 
This is assuming households with children will secure a bigger living space as the 
household size is larger. The term “bigger” will be defined in the next paragraph. 
 
“Bigger” properties 
“Bigger” property mentioned in the assumption is defined as the non-Class A 
residential properties as defined in the Technical Notes of the Rating and Valuation 
Department (2009). In other words, residential flats with saleable area more than or 
equal to 40 m2 will be classified as big. On the other hand, any Class A flat will be 
classified as “small” (less than 40 m2). 
 
Hypothesis 2 will be tested against the null hypothesis of: 
If there is a premium for better school on property price, then it is not larger for 
households with education needs. 
 
Hypothesis 2 will be supported if this null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Experiments 
Experiment 1: Boundary 
The studying of boundary follows the footstep of Black (1999) which used a 
boundary-fixed approach to minimize the effect of neighbourhood characteristics. 
Clark and Herrin (2000) suggested that the approach can only work on a fairly small 
area and this is suitable for the case in Hong Kong. 
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The study also follows the concept of Bogart and Cromwell (1999), which purposely 
pick the school nets which are perceived by parents to be “better” so that it is more 
applicable to the case in Hong Kong. The primary school nets chosen in the study are 
both under the same secondary school net. This secondary school net is regarded as a 
famous one as mentioned in various publications in Hong Kong (Chiu 2004, Sing Tao 
Daily 2006, Sun Daily 2007, Oriental Daily 2008a and Oriental Daily 2008b). 
 
As mentioned earlier, there is almost nowhere in Hong Kong where highly transacted 
residential properties are found on both sides of a school net boundary. The only 
feasible location found, given the further restriction adopted from Bogart and 
Cromwell (1999), is the boundary between primary school net 34 and 36 along Ma 
Tau Chung Road. Along this boundary, 2 housing estates are chosen to test the 
hypothesis, and they are namely Majestic Park in school net 34 and Horae Place in net 
36. 
 
Figure 4: Appearance of Majestic 
Park
 
 
 
Figure 5: Appearance of Horae 
Place 
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The locations of the 2 housing estates are shown below, with Majestic Park 
highlighted in Red and Horae Place highlighted in purple. 
 
Figure 6: A map showing properties of the first test 
 
Centaline Property Agency (2010c) 
 
Table 4: Details for the properties in the first test 
Development 
Occupation 
Date 
Number of 
Floor 
Class 
Gross Floor Area 
School net 
Majestic Park Jul-98 5 to 29 A, B, & C 560 to 1173 34
Horae Place Jul-98 5 to 22 A & B 498 to 718 36
 
According to the definition of “better school” defined in the hypothesis section and 
the Primary School Profile (2004) which stated the number of school place in each 
school, primary school net 34 had 299 better primary 1 school places while primary 
school net 36 had none before the merger. Considering the number of students eligible 
for the admission of primary 1 in each school net basing on the population data of the 
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Census and Statistics Department (2006), there were 2.85 students competing for 1 
better school place in net 34 while there was no better school place in net 36 under the 
Central Allocation System of primary school places. As a result, by adopting the 
definition of “better school net” in the hypothesis section, net 34 will be the better 
school net in this case, comparing to net 36. Also, it should be noted that the 2 
primary school nets belong to the same secondary school net so that the effect of CAS 
under SSPA is controlled. 
 
Experiment 2: merger 
Complementing the boundary test is the experiment on the effect of merger. In July 
2005, the Education Bureau of the HKSAR Government announced that the primary 
school net 34 and 36 will be merged and form a new primary school net 34. The exact 
date is not provided and it is assumed by this dissertation to be on 1st July, 2005. The 
assumption is supported by some news recording the merger (Ming Pao 2005, Apple 
Daily 2005 and Sing Tao Daily 2005). Newspaper and the internet had shown no sign 
of ex-ante expectation. The merger yields implications on the probability in getting 
into a better school under the Central Allocation System in each net. As school net 36 
has no better school, it saves the trouble of quantifying the quality of each school. 
 
From the findings from the previous paragraph, there was about 36.50% chance of 
getting into a better school in primary school net 34 before the merger while the 
chance was 0 in net 36. After the merger, the children from net 36 were able to apply 
for schools in net 34 because they became 1 single school net. The former primary 
school net 34 was worse off and the primary school net 36 was better off after the 
merger as the new chance became 18.95% for both nets. The test on the change will 
be carried out repeatedly with different samples. 
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Table 5: Chance of getting into a better school 
 Net 34 Net36 
Before merger 36.50% 0.00% 
After merger 18.95% 18.95% 
 
Only the effect of merger on net 36 will be tested because the media described net 36 
as better off after the merger (Apple Daily 2006, Sing Tao Daily 2007a, Sing Tao 
Daily 2007b and Hong Kong Economic Times 2008) while net 34, after the merger, 
was not described as worse off but was still said to be a famous school net together 
with former net 36 (Sun Daily 2007, Oriental Daily 2008a and Oriental Daily 2008b). 
No adverse information is found regarding to the worse off of net 34. Given the 
importance of informal information in school choice in Hong Kong, the author would 
test on the effect of merger in net 36 but not in net 34 as the latter is believed to be 
insignificant. 
 
Experiment design: 3 tests and a robustness check 
This research tests the hypotheses by 2 experiments and a robustness check using 
Hedonic Pricing Model. 3 regression tests are done and each test adopts different 
controls and they jointly aim at identifying the premium for better school. 
 
The studied period is from 1st January 2003 to 31st August 2009. As there was another 
school net merger in 2002 which may distort the result, the studied period has to start 
in 2003. The studied period ends in August 2009 because the deflator used in the 
dissertation is only available until this time and the author would like to include as 
many transactions as possible. 
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First test: examining boundaries of school nets 
It tests hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
If the school net is better, then the residential property price in the school net will be 
higher. 
 
A small scale regression is done by comparing 2 different housing estates on the 
opposite sides of the primary school net boundary, namely Majestic Park in primary 
school net 34 and Horae Place in primary school net 36. As discussed, net 34 is 
considered to be better than net 36. This test aims at identifying the effect of better 
schooling on the residential property price by reducing the influence of locational and 
neighbourhood factors to minimal. The effect of the merger of school nets, which 
worsened net 34 and improved net 36, will also be studied. 
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The equation for the first test is as followed: 
LOG(NP) = a0 + a1LOG(INDEX) + a2AGE + a3FLOOR + a4GAREA + a5GAREA2 
+a6NET36 + a7NET36*POST200507 
 
Table 6: Explanations and expected signs of the variables in the first test 
Variable Explanation Expected sign 
LOG(NP) Logarithm of the nominal price  
LOG(INDEX) Logarithm of the deflator of nominal price + 
AGE  Age of the building in terms of month - 
FLOOR Floor level + 
GAREA Gross floor area (square feet) + 
GAREA2 Square term of gross floor area (square feet) - 
NET36 A dummy variable which equals to 1 for 
transactions in Primary school net 36 (worse 
school net) and otherwise 0 
- 
NET36*POST200507 A variable which equals to 1 when the 
transaction is in the Primary school net 36 
after July 2005 (date of the announcement 
for merger) and otherwise 0 
+ 
 
School net 36 is considered worse than net 34 under this dissertation given the 
evidence and definition in the earlier part of this chapter. Coefficient NET36 yields 
implication on the first testable implication of hypothesis 1 by testing if the property 
in net 36 is lower than those in net 34. Given hypothesis 1, the coefficient is predicted 
to be negative. NET36*POST200507 is testing the second testable implication of 
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hypothesis 1 which predicts that property price will increase when the school net 
becomes better. So, NET36*POST200507 is predicted to be positive given that net 36 
is better off after the merger. 
 
Second test: generalizing the hypothesis by pooling more transactions 
The test aims at testing hypothesis 1 again by including more transactions from the 2 
nets so as to generalize the hypothesis. This is similar to the first test except that the 
buildings are not all situated along the school net boundary so that there is a lack of 
control over locational and neighbourhood characteristics. The coefficient NET36 is 
merely a control over these characteristics and the bias of property price in general in 
the 2 school nets as the property price in net 34 is apparently higher than in net 36 in 
general but the effect of school net is indistinguishable from locational and 
neighbourhood characteristics. As a consequence, it is not appropriate to establish the 
argument simply basing on the result of NET36 though it can be in line with the 
prediction of hypothesis 1 (negative). The focus of this test is therefore on the 
coefficient of the different effect of merger over the net 36 (NET36*POST200507).  
 
Hypothesis 1 is: 
If the school net is better, then the residential property price in the school net will be 
higher. 
 
The housing estates include Dragon View, Ellery Terrace and Majestic Park in net 34 
as well as Metropolitan Rise, Horae Place, Jubilant Place and Hillville Terrace in net 
36.  Their details are listed in the following table. 
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Table 7: Details of the properties in the second test 
Development 
Occupation 
Date 
Number of 
Floor 
Class 
Gross Floor Area 
School net 
Dragon View Jun-98 1 to 25 B 665 to 1028 34
Ellery Terrace Sep-00 8 to 46 C 1168 to 1528 34
Majestic Park Jul-98 5 to 29 A, B, & C 560 to 1173 34
Metropolitan Rise Apr-01 5 to 40 A & B 539 to 739 36
Horae Place Jul-98 5 to 22 A & B 498 to 718 36
Jubilant Place Jan-98 2 to 20 B 691 to 1037 36
Hillville Terrace Oct-99 6 to 29 B 890 to 941 36
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The equation for the second test is: 
LOG(NP) = a0 + a1LOG(INDEX) + a2AGE + a3FLOOR + a4GAREA + a5GAREA2 
+a6NET36 + a7NET36*POST200507 
 
Table 8: Explanations and expected signs of the variables in the second test 
Variable Explanation Expected sign 
LOG(NP) Logarithm of the nominal price  
LOG(INDEX) Logarithm of the deflator of nominal price + 
AGE   Age of the building in terms of month - 
FLOOR  Floor level + 
GAREA  Gross floor area (square feet) + 
GAREA2 Square term of gross floor area (square feet) - 
NET36  A dummy variable which equals to 1 for 
transactions in Primary school net 36 (worse 
school net) and otherwise 0 
- 
NET36*POST200507 A variable which equals to 1 when the 
transaction is in the Primary school net 36 
after July 2005 (date of the announcement 
for merger) and otherwise 0 
+ 
 
Using the same rationale as the first test, the coefficient NET36*POST200507 is 
predicted to be positive. 
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Third test: testing the effect on flats with different sizes 
The dataset used is the same as the second test. The test aims at testing hypothesis 2 
by including variable NET36*BIG*POST200507. By incorporating this variable, the 
effect of school net merger on big flats will be captured and NET36*POST200507 
will be reflecting the effect on the flats in net 36 in general. As the test focuses on the 
effect of merger on bigger flats in net 36, the author carefully capture any asymmetric 
correlation between the deflators and the flat with different sizes (BIG or non-BIG) by 
the addition of the variable INDEX*BIG. The result is more promising after capturing 
the bias on larger flats due to the different betas of the coefficient INDEX. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is: 
If there is a premium for better school on property price, then it is larger for 
households with education needs. 
 
The equation for the third test is: 
LOG(NP) = a0 + a1LOG(INDEX) + a2LOG(INDEX)*BIG+ a3AGE + a4FLOOR + 
a5GAREA + a6GAREA2 +a7NET36 + a8NET36*POST200507 + 
a9NET36*BIG*POST200507 
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Table 9: Explanations and expected signs of the variables in the third test 
Variable Explanation Expected 
sign 
LOG(NP) Logarithm of the nominal price  
LOG(INDEX) Logarithm of the deflator of nominal price + 
LOG(INDEX)
*BIG 
A dummy variable which represents logarithm of the 
deflator of nominal price when it is a non-Class A flat 
? 
AGE   Age of the building in terms of month - 
FLOOR  Floor level + 
GAREA  Gross floor area (square feet) + 
GAREA2 Square term of gross floor area (square feet) - 
NET36  A dummy variable which equals to 1 for transactions 
in Primary school net 36 (worse school net) and 
otherwise 0 
- 
NET36* 
POST200507 
A variable which equals to 1 when the transaction is in 
the Primary school net 36 after July 2005 (date of the 
announcement for merger) and otherwise 0 
+ 
 
NET36*BIG* 
POST200507 
A variable which equals to 1 when the transaction in 
the Primary school net 36 after July 2005 (date of the 
announcement for merger) and it is a non-Class A 
property. Otherwise it is 0 
+ 
 
The coefficient NET36*BIG*POST200507 is predicted to be positive given 
hypothesis 2 while NET36*POST200507 is predicted to be positive under hypothesis 
1. 
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Robustness Check 
It aims at testing the hypothesis 1 again by strictly controlling the 
development-specific factors. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is: 
If the school net is better, then the residential property price in the school net will be 
higher. 
 
Another small scale regression comparing 2 different housing estates is carried out, 
with one of them in net 34 and the other in net 36. The 2 housing estates are Dragon 
View in school net 34 and Hillville Terrace in net 36. The structural characteristics are 
very similar so that they are well controlled. As all the properties are non-Class A flats 
(Class B), it avoids the bias of the different effect of school nets over Class A and 
non-Class A properties as tested in the third test. However, the 2 housing estates are 
not chosen along the boundary so that this experiment cannot yield implication on 
school net coefficient. It is merely a control for locational and neighbourhood 
characteristics. The coefficient of the different effect of merger over the 2 nets is the 
highlight of this test. 
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Figure 7: Appearance of Dragon 
View 
 
Figure 8: Appearance of Hillville 
Terrace 
 
 
The locations of the 2 housing estates are shown below, with Dragon View 
highlighted in red and Hillville Terrace highlighted in purple. 
 
Figure 9: A map showing the properties of the robustness check 
 
Centaline Property Agency (2010c) 
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Table 10: Details for the properties in the robustness check 
Development 
Occupation 
Date 
Number of 
Floor 
Class 
Gross Floor 
Area 
School net 
Dragon View Jun-98 1 to 25 B 665 to 1028 34 
Hillville Terrace Oct-99 6 to 29 B 890 to 941 36 
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The equation for the robustness check is as followed. 
LOG(NP) = a0 + a1LOG(INDEX) + a2AGE + a3FLOOR + a4GAREA + a5GAREA2 
+a6NET36 + a7NET36*POST200507 
 
Table 11: Explanations and expected signs of the variables in the robustness check 
Variable Explanation Expected sign 
LOG(NP) Logarithm of the nominal price  
LOG(INDEX) Logarithm of the deflator of nominal price + 
AGE   Age of the building in terms of month - 
FLOOR  Floor level + 
GAREA  Gross floor area (square feet) + 
GAREA2 Square term of gross floor area (square feet) - 
NET36  A dummy variable which equals to 1 for 
transactions in Primary school net 36 (worse 
school net) and otherwise 0 
- 
NET36*POST200507 A variable considering the transaction in the 
Primary school net 36 after July 2005 (date 
of the announcement for merger) 
+ 
 
The coefficient for NET36*POST200507 is meaningful and is predicted to be positive 
under hypothesis 1, given the similar structural characteristics of the 2 properties and 
the control for location and neighbourhood by the coefficient NET36. 
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Variables included in the equation 
Dependent variable 
Logarithm of nominal price (LOG(PRICE)) 
Nominal prices are gathered from the EPRC database and they are expressed in Hong 
Kong Dollars (million). 
 
Independent variable 
Logarithm of deflator (LOG(INDEX) and LOG(INDEX)*BIG) 
Only the real transaction price is the concern of the tests as the nominal price could be 
biased by time-effect caused by inflation and other market fluctuations. As a result, an 
independent variable “INDEX” is adopted to deflate the nominal prices to real prices. 
This index is obtained from Rating and Valuation Department (2010a and 2010b) and 
it uses 1999 as base year. The monthly index will be used as the property market in 
Hong Kong is volatile and this makes quarterly or yearly data unsuitable. Also, 
different indices are calculated for flats of different “Class”. There are 5 Classes as 
shown in Appendix 1 and they are classified by their saleable floor area. The deflator 
(INDEX) for each transaction will be using the appropriate index according to its 
Class. 
 
Instead of incorporating the index in the nominal price and form a dependent variable 
for the tests, it will be included as an independent variable since the selected 
properties may not be 100% correlated to the index which serves the whole territory. 
It is expected to find a positive coefficient. 
 
Log(INDEX)*BIG will be included in the third test so as to capture any potential 
difference in the interaction of price and the deflator. 
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Age (AGE) 
Age of the building at the time of transaction is calculated on a monthly basis. The 
number of months between the Occupation Date provided by Centaline Property 
Agency (2010c) and the date of instrument for the transaction will be considered as 
the age of the building. 
 
In general, buildings will deteriorate and therefore depreciate gradually. It is expected 
to find a negative coefficient. 
 
Floor level (FLOOR) 
Floor level means the number of floor a flat is located above the ground level. 
Generally speaking, properties at a higher floor levels are preferred by the purchasers 
as lower floor levels suffer from nuisance such as traffic noise and higher floor levels 
enjoy a better view. It is expected to find a positive coefficient. 
 
Gross Floor Area (GAREA) 
The area is defined by Regulation 23(3) of the Building (Planning) Regulations 
(Cap 123) which states that “the gross floor area of a building shall be the area 
contained within the external walls of the building measured at each floor level 
(including any floor below the level of the ground), together with the area of each 
balcony in the building, which shall be calculated from the overall dimensions of the 
balcony (including the thickness of the sides thereof), and the thickness of the external 
walls of the building”. 
 
Purchasers are expected to pay for the extra area and it is expected to find a positive 
coefficient. 
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School net (NET36) 
Dummy variable is employed as school net is qualitative and impossible to be 
quantified in terms of numbers. Property transactions are assigned with a dummy 
variable according to the Primary school net they are in, namely net 34 and net 36. 
The dummy variable NET36 equals to 1 when the property is in the school net 36 and 
it is 0 when the property is not in net 36 (net 34). 
 
Effect of merger (NET36*POST200507) 
The effect of the merger on school net 36 will be tested and the detail will be 
discussed in the later part of this chapter. As the merger occurred in July 2005, the 
dummy variable POST200507 will be 1 if the transactions took place after the merger 
and will be 0 if the transaction took place before the merger. Therefore, the variable 
NET36*POST200507 represents the transaction in school net 36 after the merger. 
 
Effect of merger on non-Class A properties (NET36*BIG*POST200507) 
The dummy variable BIG equals to 1 when the flat is non-Class A property and 0 
when it is Class A property. NET36*BIG*POST200507 represents the transactions in 
school net 36 after the merger and they are non-Class A properties. 
 
Square term (GAREA^2) 
Square term of gross floor area is employed to capture any possible non-linear effect 
of the variables. It represents the rate of change of the variable. 
 
Functional form adopted 
Linneman (1980) showed that 86% overestimation of his results from hedonic pricing 
model could be explained by inappropriate choice of functional form. The choice is 
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made depending on whether prior information is available. If prior information is 
available, there will be not much trouble. However, if there is none, trial and error 
approach have to be used. 
 
Testing of better education well established by extensive literatures discussed in 
Chapter 2. It is the practice of using Semi-Log method to carry out the regression and 
it will be followed in this dissertation. Ordinary Least Square technique, which 
minimize sum of the squares of the differences between the actual and the forecast 
value of the dependent variable, will be used. Linear function is assumed. 
 
Source of data 
The observations of the transactions of selected residential properties are collected 
from the Economic Property Research Centre (EPRC) database. It contains 
transaction data of the property sales in Hong Kong since 1991. All the transactions 
are gathered from the Land Registry of the HKSAR Government. Each of the 
transaction includes the nominal price, unit, floor level, gross floor area and date of 
instrument. Information on Occupation Date as provided by Centaline Property 
Agency is used to calculate AGE. 
 
Although the tests in this dissertation only focus on residential flat sale transactions, 
the author is aware of the alternative of renting a flat. However, such rental record is 
not available and the tests can only be done on the purchase of flats. It is believed that 
the potential premium for better school on rent is reflected on prices because price is 
theoretically the discounted value of the future income, rent. 
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Also, only second-hand transactions will be included in the tests. This is done by the 
choice of the studied period. The start of the period is years after the occupation of the 
buildings. 
 
Adjustment for data 
It is observed that there are duplications among the transactions and they are excluded 
from the dataset. All the Re-Agreement of Sale and Purchase and duplicated 
Provisional Agreement of Sale and Purchase are excluded. 
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, there are 2 experiments to test the 2 hypotheses of the 
dissertation. The 2 experiments will be conducted in 3 tests and a final robustness check 
will be included at last. In the first test, hypothesis 1 will be tested by studying the 
boundary of school nets as well as the effect of merger. In the second test, hypothesis 1 
will be tested again by pooling more housing estates so as to generalize the hypothesis 
and the focus is on school net merger only. In the third test, hypothesis 2 will be tested 
by working out the second test again and capturing the effect of merger on non-Class A 
properties. In the robustness check, very similar properties in net 34 and 36 will be 
chosen to test hypothesis 1 to further substantiate the findings by minimizing the 
variation in structural characteristics, such as difference in Class. The results of the tests 
are shown in this chapter so that they can be compared with the predictions. 
 
First test: examining boundaries of school nets 
This test aims at testing hypothesis 1 by following the boundary-fixed approach in 
Black (1999) and, at the same time, testing hypothesis by studying the effect of merger. 
School net 36 is the worse school net before the merger and it became better after the 
merger as defined in Chapter 4. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
If the school net is better, then the residential property price in the school net will be 
higher. 
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Equation: 
LOG(NP) = a0 + a1LOG(INDEX) + a2AGE + a3FLOOR + a4GAREA + a5GAREA2 
+a6NET36 + a7NET36*POST200507 
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Table 12: Descriptive data of the first test: 
Whole dataset: 
 PRICE INDEX AGE FLOOR GAREA 
 Mean  3.371413  96.38261  97.90870  14.46957  795.4783 
 Maximum  21.00000  147.1000  136.0000  29.00000  1173.000 
 Minimum  0.600000  58.50000  55.00000  5.000000  498.0000 
 Std. Dev.  1.689052  19.70213  23.43076  5.756063  203.2389 
 Observations  230  230  230  230  230 
 
Net34: 
 PRICE INDEX AGE FLOOR GAREA 
 Mean  3.935396  94.96558  96.81169  14.61688  886.6558 
 Maximum  21.00000  147.1000  136.0000  29.00000  1173.000 
 Minimum  0.600000  58.50000  55.00000  5.000000  560.0000 
 Std. Dev.  1.802402  20.56371  24.55560  5.947700  186.6924 
 Observations  154  154  154  154  154 
 
Net36: 
 PRICE INDEX AGE FLOOR GAREA 
 Mean  2.228605  99.25395  100.1316  14.17105  610.7237 
 Maximum  2.930000  126.4000  136.0000  22.00000  718.0000 
 Minimum  1.380000  60.00000  56.00000  5.000000  498.0000 
 Std. Dev.  0.327194  17.60964  20.94586  5.372493  57.96012 
 Observations  76  76  76  76  76 
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Table 13: Extract of EVIEWS result of the first test 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PRICE)   
Method: Least Squares    
Included observations: 230   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -5.670071 0.939105 -6.037742 0.0000 *** 
LOG(INDEX) 1.149493 0.216130 5.318519 0.0000 *** 
AGE -0.003188 0.001864 -1.709754 0.0887 * 
FLOOR 0.002407 0.001703 1.413793 0.1588  
GAREA 0.003824 0.000542 7.053017 0.0000 *** 
GAREA^2 -1.65E-06 3.23E-07 -5.105608 0.0000 *** 
NET36 -0.247134 0.033646 -7.345116 0.0000 *** 
NET36*POST200507 0.015718 0.032280 0.486919 0.6268  
R-squared 0.712026    Mean dependent var 1.132214  
Adjusted R-squared 0.702946    S.D. dependent var 0.394646  
S.E. of regression 0.215093    Akaike info criterion -0.201332  
Sum squared resid 10.27080    Schwarz criterion -0.081746  
Log likelihood 31.15316    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.153094  
F-statistic 78.41476    Durbin-Watson stat 1.694161  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     
Note: *** means significant at 1% level 
** means significant at 5% level 
* means significant at 10% level 
63 
 
Table 14: Extract of result of the first test 
Independent 
variable 
Explanation Expected 
sign 
Actual 
sign 
Level of 
significance 
LOGINDEX) Logarithm of the 
deflator of nominal price
+ + 1% 
AGE  Age of the building in 
terms of month 
- - 10% 
FLOOR Floor level + + Insignificant 
GAREA Gross floor area (square 
feet) 
+ + 1% 
GAREA2 Square term of gross 
floor area (square feet) 
- - 1% 
NET36 A dummy variable 
which equals to 1 for 
transactions in Primary 
school net 36 (worse 
school net) and 
otherwise 0 
- - 1% 
NET36*POST200507 A variable representing 
the transaction in the 
primary school net 36 
after 1st July 2005 
(merger) 
+ + Insignificant 
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Adjusted R-square is 0.702946 which indicates that about 70.3% of the change in price 
can be explained by the change in the independent variable(s). F-statistic is <0.01%. 
This rejects the null hypothesis which assumes none of the independent variable can 
explain the change of the dependent variable. 
 
The coefficient of the independent variables of LOG(INDEX), AGE, GAREA, 
GAREA2 and NET36 are significant and the signs are as expected. However, despite 
the expected signs, FLOOR and NET36*POST200507 are insignificant. 
 
The positive sign for LOG(INDEX) represents the property prices studied are in line 
with the deflator index. The negative coefficient of AGE follows the logic that 
buildings would deteriorate over time. The positive coefficient of GAREA and negative 
coefficient of GAREA2 indicates that buyers are willing to pay more for extra space but 
this effect diminishes when the gross floor area increases. 
 
The negative coefficient of NET36 means the property in net 36, as represented by 
Horae Place, is having a 24% lower property price than the property in net 34, as 
represented by Majestic Park. This confirms hypothesis 1 given the fact that net 34 is a 
better school net than net 36 in terms of the probability to get into better schools. 
 
The insignificance of NET36*POST200507’s coefficient could be resulted from the 
insufficiency in observations. Therefore hypothesis 1 is rejected as the insignificant 
result fails to reject the null hypothesis of “If the school net is better, then the 
residential property price in the school net will not be higher.”. However, the author 
suggests that the result could be distorted by the variation in structural characteristics of 
the 2 housing estates. The 2 housing estates are occupied in the same year, having 
65 
 
similar storeys and are located on the opposite sides of the same road, but the gross 
floor area of the flats in the developments varies quite a lot, with the flats in Majestic 
Park is generally larger. The descriptive data is provided in Table 11. 
 
The insignificance of FLOOR’s coefficient is believed to be the result of the 
insufficiency in observations. Also, it might be due to the fact that the property is not 
located along main roads or adjacent to an open view so that higher floor level may not 
help reducing the nuisance or yielding extra benefits. 
 
Merit and limitations 
The negative and significant coefficient of NET36 confirms hypothesis 1 and 
reinforces the idea of Black (1999) which suggested that the premium for better school 
exists, given the well controlled locational and neighbourhood characteristics in this 
small studied area. 
 
However, the test only included 2 housing estates with 216 transactions due to the 
limited choice for the boundary test and it may leads to insufficiency in sample size. 
The restricted small studied area prevents an effective control for development-specific 
characteristics. Therefore, the coefficient of NET36 may include other omitted 
development-specific factors. Also, the coefficient for NET36*POST200507 is 
insignificant and hypothesis 1 is rejected. 
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Second test: generalizing the hypothesis by pooling more 
transactions 
This test attempts to test hypothesis 1 in light of the deficiency of the first test. More 
housing estates in net 34 and net 36 are under studied. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
If the school net is better, then the residential property price in the school net will be 
higher. 
 
The equation for the second test is: 
LOG(NP) = a0 + a1LOG(INDEX) + a2AGE + a3FLOOR + a4GAREA + a5GAREA2 
+a6NET36 + a7NET36*POST200507 
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Table 15: Descriptive data of the second and the third test 
Whole dataset: 
 PRICE AGE INDEX FLOOR GAREA 
 Mean  3.761732  86.34837  97.22994  16.49232  904.0192 
 Maximum  21.00000  143.0000  147.9000  46.00000  1528.000 
 Minimum  0.600000  23.00000  56.60000  1.000000  498.0000 
 Std. Dev.  1.830446  28.71317  19.31476  10.26697  249.6097 
 Observations  1042  1042  1042  1042  1042 
 
Net34: 
 PRICE AGE INDEX FLOOR GAREA 
 Mean  4.900497  83.53638  98.74033  19.02911  1043.322 
 Maximum  21.00000  137.0000  147.9000  46.00000  1528.000 
 Minimum  0.600000  31.00000  58.50000  1.000000  560.0000 
 Std. Dev.  2.036589  27.38832  21.57482  11.18533  253.0295 
 Observations  481  481  481  481  481 
 
Net36: 
 PRICE AGE INDEX FLOOR GAREA 
 Mean  2.785358  88.75936  95.93494  14.31729  784.5811 
 Maximum  5.738000  143.0000  126.4000  40.00000  1037.000 
 Minimum  0.980000  23.00000  56.60000  2.000000  498.0000 
 Std. Dev.  0.777420  29.61438  17.05508  8.856951  173.1593 
 Observations  561  561  561  561  561 
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Table 16: Extract of EVIEWS result of the second test 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PRICE)   
Method: Least Squares    
Included observations: 1042    
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -3.883953 0.150171 -25.86353 0.0000 *** 
LOG(INDEX) 0.813196 0.030415 26.73661 0.0000 *** 
AGE -0.000807 0.000237 -3.408626 0.0007 *** 
FLOOR 0.005971 0.000498 11.98722 0.0000 *** 
GAREA 0.002176 0.000119 18.27309 0.0000 *** 
GAREA^2 -5.51E-07 6.22E-08 -8.854523 0.0000 *** 
NET36 -0.217658 0.015276 -14.24864 0.0000 *** 
NET36*POST200507 0.035104 0.015914 2.205895 0.0276 ** 
R-squared 0.873596    Mean dependent var 1.228013  
Adjusted R-squared 0.872741    S.D. dependent var 0.430394  
S.E. of regression 0.153536    Akaike info criterion -0.902114  
Sum squared resid 24.37482    Schwarz criterion -0.864119  
Log likelihood 478.0016    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.887702  
F-statistic 1020.879    Durbin-Watson stat 1.967431  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     
Note: *** means significant at 1% level 
** means significant at 5% level 
* means significant at 10% level 
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Table 17: Extract of result of the second test 
Independent 
variable 
Explanation Expected 
sign 
Actual 
sign 
Level of 
significance 
LOG(INDEX) Logarithm of the 
deflator of nominal price
+ + 1% 
AGE  Age of the building in 
terms of month 
- - 1% 
FLOOR Floor level + + 1% 
GAREA Gross floor area (square 
feet) 
+ + 1% 
GAREA2 Square term of gross 
floor area (square feet) 
- - 1% 
NET36 A dummy variable 
which equals to 1 for 
transactions in Primary 
school net 36 (worse 
school net) and 
otherwise 0 
- - 1% 
NET36*POST200507 A variable representing 
the transaction in the 
primary school net 36 
after 1st July 2005 
(merger) 
+ + 5% 
 
Adjusted R-square is 0.872741 which indicates that about 87.3% of the change in price 
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can be explained by the change in the independent variable(s). F-statistic is <0.01%. 
This rejects the null hypothesis which assumes none of the independent variable can 
explain the change of the dependent variable. 
 
As the implications and the rationales for variables LOG(INDEX), AGE, FLOOR, 
GAREA and GAREA2 are discussed in the previous test, they will not be discussed 
again in this or the following tests unless they are insignificant or their signs contradict 
with the predictions. The focus of the interpretation would be on the interaction terms 
that are test-specific or those that yield implications to the hypothesis. In this test, the 
signs for LOG(INDEX), AGE, FLOOR, GAREA, GAREA2 are under prediction and 
significant. 
 
NET36 in this test will not be meaningful as discussed in Chapter 4. It is merely 
controlling the locational and neighbourhood characteristics and representing the 
difference in price in general over net 34 and net 36. 
 
The coefficient of NET36*POST200507 is positive and significant. It shows that the 
prices of residential properties in net 36 increases by 3.1% after the merger. This 
confirms hypothesis 1 which predicts a higher property price when the school net gets 
better. 
 
Merit and limitation 
The test remedies the study in the first test by pooling more transactions in both net. 
The positive and significant coefficient of NET36*POST200507 confirms hypothesis 1 
which states that the property price will be higher when the school net is better. 
However, as the sample includes more building, there could be more omitted variables. 
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Third test: testing the effect on flats with different sizes 
The transactions in the dataset of the second test are further categorized under Class A 
(SMALL) and non-Class A property (BIG) as defined in the part “Definitions” in 
Chapter 4. The test is based on the assumption that families with children would prefer 
larger flats and it aims at testing hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is: 
If there is a premium for better school on property price, then it is larger for 
households with education needs. 
 
The equation for the third test is: 
LOG(NP) = a0 + a1LOG(INDEX) + a2LOG(INDEX)*BIG+ a3AGE + a4FLOOR + 
a5GAREA + a6GAREA2 +a7NET36 + a8NET36*POST200507 + 
a9NET36*BIG*POST200507 
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Table 18: Extract of EVIEWS result of the third test 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PRICE)   
Method: Least Squares    
Included observations: 1042    
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
C -3.791406 0.152346 -24.88689 0.0000 *** 
LOG(INDEX) 0.840774 0.030429 27.63077 0.0000 *** 
LOG(INDEX)*BIG 0.001531 0.006108 0.250664 0.8021  
AGE -0.001189 0.000258 -4.605843 0.0000 *** 
FLOOR 0.006116 0.000478 12.80511 0.0000 *** 
GAREA 0.001826 0.000158 11.57208 0.0000 *** 
GAREA^2 -4.05E-07 7.75E-08 -5.217652 0.0000 *** 
NET36 -0.231328 0.014945 -15.47907 0.0000 *** 
NET36*POST200507 -0.037530 0.029307 -1.280567 0.2006  
NET36*POST200507*BIG 0.109719 0.029885 3.671434 0.0003 *** 
R-squared 0.876753    Mean dependent var 1.228013  
Adjusted R-squared 0.875678    S.D. dependent var 0.430394  
S.E. of regression 0.151754    Akaike info criterion -0.923566  
Sum squared resid 23.76611    Schwarz criterion -0.876071  
Log likelihood 491.1777    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.905551  
F-statistic 815.7156    Durbin-Watson stat 1.977460  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     
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Table 19: Extract of result of the third test 
Independent 
variable 
Explanation Expected 
sign 
Actual 
sign 
Level of 
significance 
LOG(INDEX) Logarithm of the deflator of nominal price + + 1% 
LOG(INDEX)* 
BIG 
A dummy variable which represents logarithm of the deflator of nominal price 
when it is a non-Class A flat 
? + Insignificant  
AGE  Age of the building in terms of month - - 1% 
FLOOR Floor level + + 1% 
GAREA Gross floor area (square feet) + + 1% 
GAREA2 Square term of gross floor area (square feet) - - 1% 
NET36 A dummy variable which equals to 1 for transactions in Primary school net 36 
(worse school net) and otherwise 0 
- - 1% 
NET36* 
POST200507 
A variable representing the transaction in the primary school net 36 after 1st July 
2005 (merger) 
+ - Insignificant  
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NET36*BIG* 
POST200507 
A variable which equals to 1 when the transaction in the Primary school net 36 after 
July 2005 (date of the announcement for merger) and it is a non-Class A property. 
Otherwise it is 0 
+ + 1% 
75 
 
Adjusted R-square is 0.875678 which indicates that about 87.6% of the change in price 
can be explained by the change in the independent variable(s). F-statistic is <0.01%. 
This rejects the null hypothesis which assumes none of the independent variable can 
explain the change of the dependent variable. 
 
In this test, the signs for LOG(INDEX), AGE, FLOOR, GAREA and GAREA2 are all 
under prediction and they are significant. NET36 cannot yield implication as it is again 
representing the general price discrepancy between the 2 school nets. 
 
The coefficient of NET36*BIG*POST200507 is positive and significant. This implies 
a 7% increase in property price in school net 36 applies to non-Class A flats (big flats). 
The result for NET36*POST200507 represent the effect of merger on Class A 
properties (small flats) in net 36 is insignificant, which implies that it is not affected by 
the merger in statistical sense. The test controls the different price variation of larger 
flats over time comparing to the smaller flats. This is done by the deflator INDEX*BIG 
which takes into account “Class” (BIG). As larger flats are allowed to have a different 
sensitivity to changes in the deflator (BIG*INDEX), the result of a positive 
NET36*BIG*POST200507 is further strengthened. 
 
LOG(INDEX)*BIG is found insignificant. It means that there is no identifiable 
correlation between the deflator and the non-Class A flats on top of the correlation 
between the deflator and Class A flats. 
 
Merit and limitation 
The test confirms hypothesis 2 which opens the research gap for future studies. 
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However, the proxy used is not conventional and there is no theoretical background in 
adopting Class A and non-Class A definition. Other proxies could be used to test the 
hypothesis again in the future. 
 
Robustness check 
The development-specific factors are not strictly controlled in the three above tests. 
This test aims at checking the robustness of the tests by controlling the 
development-specific factors of the sample strictly so as to reinforce the findings. 
 
The equation for the robustness check is: 
LOG(NP) = a0 + a1LOG(INDEX) + a2AGE + a3FLOOR + a4GAREA + a5GAREA2 
+a6NET36 + a7NET36*POST200507 
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Table 20: Descriptive data of the robustness check 
Whole dataset: 
 PRICE AGE INDEX FLOOR GAREA 
 Mean  3.655461  91.82383  97.28705  13.50777  857.0155 
 Maximum  5.990000  134.0000  126.4000  29.00000  1028.000 
 Minimum  1.830000  25.00000  58.50000  1.000000  665.0000 
 Std. Dev.  0.746133  28.95309  17.03812  7.212633  111.3073 
 Observations  193  193  193  193  193 
 
Net34: 
 PRICE AGE INDEX FLOOR GAREA 
 Mean  3.650789  101.6842  98.34408  12.45395  840.8618 
 Maximum  5.990000  134.0000  126.4000  25.00000  1028.000 
 Minimum  1.830000  56.00000  58.50000  1.000000  665.0000 
 Std. Dev.  0.772153  21.94859  17.68282  6.804594  120.0723 
 Observations  152  152  152  152  152 
 
Net36: 
 PRICE AGE INDEX FLOOR GAREA 
 Mean  3.672780  55.26829  93.36829  17.41463  916.9024 
 Maximum  5.738000  92.00000  119.5000  29.00000  941.0000 
 Minimum  2.520000  25.00000  63.60000  6.000000  890.0000 
 Std. Dev.  0.648928  21.58706  13.89486  7.419487  19.37757 
 Observations  41  41  41  41  41 
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Table 21: Extract of EVIEWS result of the robustness check 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PRICE)   
Method: Least Squares    
Included observations: 193    
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -5.196097 0.886859 -5.858991 0.0000 *** 
LOG(INDEX) 0.772133 0.186630 4.137248 0.0001 *** 
AGE -0.001667 0.001769 -0.942636 0.3471  
FLOOR 0.006149 0.001899 3.238086 0.0014 *** 
GAREA 0.006247 0.002297 2.719856 0.0072 *** 
GAREA^2 -3.08E-06 1.41E-06 -2.189551 0.0298 ** 
NET36 -0.220823 0.090839 -2.430921 0.0160 ** 
NET36*POST200507 0.097642 0.033071 2.952542 0.0036 *** 
R-squared 0.650837    Mean dependent var 1.274897  
Adjusted R-squared 0.637625    S.D. dependent var 0.209885  
S.E. of regression 0.126346    Akaike info criterion -1.259019  
Sum squared resid 2.953209    Schwarz criterion -1.123778  
Log likelihood 129.4954    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.204251  
F-statistic 49.26261    Durbin-Watson stat 2.505143  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     
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Table 22: Extract of result of the robustness check 
Independent 
variable 
Explanation Expected 
sign 
Actual 
sign 
Level of 
significance 
LOG(INDEX) Logarithm of the 
deflator of nominal price
+ + 1% 
AGE  Age of the building in 
terms of month 
- - Insignificant 
FLOOR Floor level + + 1% 
GAREA Gross floor area (square 
feet) 
+ + 1% 
GAREA2 Square term of gross 
floor area (square feet) 
- - 5% 
NET36 A dummy variable 
which equals to 1 for 
transactions in Primary 
school net 36 (worse 
school net) and 
otherwise 0 
- - 5% 
NET36*POST200507 A variable representing 
the transaction in the 
primary school net 36 
after 1st July 2005 
(merger) 
+ + 1% 
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Adjusted R-square is 0.637625 which indicates that about 63.8% of the change in price 
can be explained by the change in the independent variable(s). F-statistic is <0.01%. 
This rejects the null hypothesis which assumes none of the independent variable can 
explain the change of the dependent variable. 
 
In this test, the signs for Log(INDEX), FLOOR, GAREA and GAREA2 are under 
prediction and they are significant. NET36 in this test will not be meaningful as 
discussed in Chapter 4, as it is a control for the difference in price over the 2 housing 
estates and this can be due to the difference in locational and neighbourhood 
characteristics. 
 
The coefficient of NET36*POST200507 is positive and significant, which confirms 
hypothesis 1. The positive coefficient implies an increase in price by 9% in net 36 after 
the merger. 
 
The coefficient of AGE is insignificant. It is believed to be the result of renovation and 
sound property management. 
 
Merit and limitation 
Fewer transactions are included and locational and neighbourhood characteristics may 
not be controlled as well as in the first test. Nonetheless, the test controls the “Class” 
(size of the flats) which has proven to have an implication in the third test. The positive 
and significant coefficient for NET36*POST200507 has confirmed hypothesis 1 by 
minimizing the bias due to omitted development-specific factors.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
There was no previous research working on this topic in Hong Kong. After observing 
all kinds of advertisement which rely better school net as a value enhancing attribute, 
this research aims at testing the effect of better school in Hong Kong quantitatively. It 
is concluded that premium for better school net exists and this is larger for households 
with education needs. The practical implications of the findings will be discussed. The 
limitations and areas for further study will also be included. 
 
Summary of the findings 
The first test in this dissertation had once again confirmed the effect of better school 
using the boundary-fixed approach adopted by many researchers. It had shown that 
the property price could vary by 25% when the property is located within or outside a 
better school net. However, this figure includes other omitted development-specific 
factors. 
 
The first and the second test confirmed hypothesis 1 and the third test confirmed 
hypothesis 2. This implies that school net effect does exist and it is larger on bigger 
flats. The robustness check further reinforced the idea the idea by controlling more 
development-specific factors. 
 
To sum up the regression results in this research, the school net effect does exist in 
Hong Kong, and it is very significantly affecting residential property price. This effect 
is greater for larger flats. 
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Implications of the findings 
The research confirms the premium for better school net in Hong Kong. It is the first 
empirical study in Hong Kong which establishes a scientific methodology to test the 
link. The finding can be used as a foundation for future literatures. 
 
The positive effect is justifying the inclusion of this characteristic into advertisements 
and it yields implications on property marketing strategy. Besides, developers and 
investors should be aware of the effect to make business decisions. 
 
Furthermore, the government can take it into account the premium of better schooling 
when ascertaining the effect of education policy changes. 
 
Limitations of the study 
The author tried to quantify better school and better school nets by new proxies. 
However, there is no support for such definitions as they are merely some indicators 
generally used in the public. 
 
The vague definition for big and small flats also lacks concrete evidence to support. 
There is no concrete evidence showing the preference of families with children. The 
definition of non-Class A properties is just a proxy, which the author thinks is the best, 
given the available information. 
 
Due to the difficulties in locating feasible location for the research, the test can only 
be tested on 2 primary school nets. The small scale research has led to the problem of 
insufficiency in data. The research period before and after the merger are asymmetric 
as a consequence. Due to the same reason, there are only 2 housing estates included in 
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the first test and the result may not be very accurate given the different in the omitted 
structural characteristics.  
 
Area for further studies 
The research is just a preliminary move to test the premium for better school in Hong 
Kong. Future research could verify the result by improving the methodology of the 
research. 
 
More importantly, the research shows that housing characteristic, namely a certain 
threshold of gross floor area, is a critical factor for the effect of better school. This can 
be linked to research for housing choice for families and marketing of residential 
properties. By testing the effect of better school, the preferences of families with 
children could be revealed. 
 
Last but not least, the author is also attracted by the difference in the flats’ gross floor 
area across the school net boundary. It is also found that the properties in the better 
school net, net 34, are generally more expensive. This is in line with the findings in 
Black (1999) and Kane et al. (2006). It appears to the author that the developers may 
be aware of the asymmetric effect of better school and purposely build the flats that 
suit the school net. This could be tested by future researchers. The details of the data 
could be traced from Table 11, Table 14 and Table 19. 
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Appendix 2: Price indices by class 
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Source: Rating and Valuation Department (2010a and 2010b)
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